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DENISE D. FORT

State and Tribal Water Quality
Standards Under the Clean Water Act:
A Case Study
ABSTRACT
With the congressional determination that tribes would be
treated like states for purposes of the Clean Water Act, Congress
greatly increased the potential for conflict between standardsset by
states and those set by neighboring tribes. The dispute between the
City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Isleta Pueblo provides a case study of the legal
issues that these disputes raise.
This case study exposes deficiencies in our national structure
for the protection of water quality. Interjurisdictionalconflicts are
not clearly addressed by Congress in the Clean Water Act, whether
they occur between states or between dischargers and tribes. EPA
has stepped into this opening and enacted regulations that provide
a predictable, if not mandated, decision rule, and that rule has been
upheld by the Supreme Court. Under this rule, the water quality of
downstream states must be protected in the permitting process. The
Clean Water Act lets states, and now tribes, determine their own
uses for water, and hence what constitutes polluted waters. When a
tribe adopts more protective standards than the state did previously,
the quiet discretion in standard setting enjoyed by states under the
Act is highlighted. Finally, because of the economic costs of controlling water pollution, tensions between tribal entities and dischargers
can be expected to persist. It is questionable whether the rules
adopted by EPA are best calculated to create good working relationships and the improvement of water quality. EPA should consider
refining its regulationsto avoid wholesale legislative revision of this
provision of the statute.
I. INTRODUCTION
Impassioned disputes between jurisdictions over environmental

* Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge the contribution of Cody Kelley (UNM, 1996) and the insights offered by
Professor Ruth Kovnat, Peter W. Balleau, and Jim Piatt, as well as many others with whom
I've discussed this case.
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standards have a long history in American environmental law.' Conflicts
among states and between Canada and the United States over acid
deposition have proven expensive and difficult to resolve.
Congress' determination that Indian tribes are to be treated as
states for purposes of the Clean Water Act adds a new dimension to
these disputes.2 In so doing, Congress increased the number of "states"
as much as ten-fold,3 thereby swelling the potential for conflict between
jurisdictions. This article examines the effect of tribal stream standards on
upstream dischargers located outside tribal borders. The conflict raised
by the application of stream standards of different jurisdictions illuminates the workings of federal water pollution control laws and some of
the unresolved policy dilemmas underlying the operations of these laws.
These issues are illustrated by the adoption of water quality standards by
a pueblo in New Mexico and the effect of this action on upstream
dischargers on the Rio Grande.
In its 1987 revision of the Clean Water Act, Congress addressed
the treatment of Indian tribes under the Act. The basic policy was clear:
tribal governments were to have the same powers enjoyed by state
governments.4
The Pueblo of Isleta is one of 11 pueblos and tribes located on the
main stem of the Rio Grande within New Mexico.' The Pueblo's
population is about 4,000 people." The Pueblo has occupied this area
since about 1200 A.D.7 In contrast, the City of Albuquerque has a
population of approximately 471,000 people, with a larger metropolitan
area population of 600,000, and is growing rapidly.
The Pueblo's boundaries begin approximately five miles
downstream from the outfall of Albuquerque's sewage treatment plant.
The Rio Grande runs between the Pueblo's boundaries and is used by the
Pueblo for irrigation. The water supply for the Pueblo's drinking water
is groundwater, but the Pueblo uses the Rio Grande for religious

1. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496 (1906).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988).
3. Telephone Interview with Matha Prothro, Director of Indian Affairs, EPA Office of
Water (June 24, 1994). This estimate is based on the 553 tribes recognized by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs on EPA's mailing list. The number of tribes that would qualify for this status,
that have water bodies on their lands, or that would be interested in administration of these
programs is unknown.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
5. Telephone Interview with Emilia Levat, Division of Environmental Health, Indian
Health Services, Albuquerque, New Mexico (une 30, 1994).
6. Steve Fox, Taking Us Down to the River: An Indian Pueblo Challenges Upstream Polluters,
The Workbook, Winter 1992, at 148.
7. Id.
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* purposes and the water is ingested as part of these ceremonies.
The Pueblo of Isleta moved expeditiodisly to apply for approval
to be treated as a state under Section 518 of the Act.8 It received this
approval from EPA on October 13, 1992. Following a public hearing, the
Pueblo adopted water quality standards for the stretch of the Rio Grande
which runs in a southerly direction through its lands. It designated the
waters for "primary contact ceremonial use," "primary contact recreational
use," "warm water fishery use," "secondary contact recreational use,"
"agricultural water supply use," and "industrial water supply use," and
promulgated numeric and narrative limitations to support these uses."
The Pueblo submitted these standards to EPA which approved them,
despite concerns EPA officials voiced about some of the standards.
The City of Albuquerque operates a wastewater sewage treatment
plant (publicly owned treatment works or "POTW") which discharges into
the Rio Grande a few miles to the north of the Isleta Reservation. The
POTW's discharge is regulated by a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES") permit, which is issued by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.'0 Following its approval of the
standards, EPA issued a revised draft NPDES permit to the City.
New Mexico promulgates water quality standards for the water
bodies in the state, establishing both designated uses and criteria to
protect those uses. It does so through its Water Quality Control Commission, which is made up of representatives from different state agencies
and several citizens appointed by the Governor." There is no designated representative of tribal governments. The State's stream standards for
this stretch of the Rio Grande cover fewer parameters and are less
stringent in some respects than those of the Pueblo.
The Pueblo's stream standards contain more numeric limitations
for protection of human health than do the State's water quality
standards. One parameter of particular importance to the City was
nitrogen. The City alleged that compliance with this standard would cost
$70-$100 million in construction costs as well as additional operating
costs." The City also contended that nitrogen, phosphorus, and turbidity
requirements "were not scientifically defensible or scientifically achiev-

8. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988). The section number from the 1987 Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101
Stat. 76, is provided for the convenience of readers and ease of reference.
9. Pueblo of Isleta, Water Quality Standards, § V(A)(1) (Jan. 24, 1992).

10. The State of New Mexico has not chosen to administer the NPDES program.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-6-3(A) (Michie 1993).
12. City of Albuquerque's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement
at 10, City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993), appealdocketed, (10th
Cir., filed Nov. 30, 1993).
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able", based on natural levels. It alleged that 4adding treatment for
ammonia would cost approximately $60 million.
The most commonly repeated argument that the City of
Albuquerque raised against the Pueblo's standard was that the standard
for arsenic exceeded the natural background level of arsenic in the river.
The Pueblo based its standard on human consumption of fish from the
river, not the regular drinking of river water, in setting an arsenic
standard of 0.0175 micrograms per liter.'5 Arsenic is present in the Rio
Grande because of the mineralized deposits through which the river
flows.' It is also present in the City's discharge because the groundwater from which the City derives its drinking water contains arsenic. The
removal of arsenic would be costly. The City gave an estimate of
approximately $248 million to install, and $26 million annually to operate,
facilities to remove arsenic to below detectable levels. 7
That litigation would result from these facts cannot come as a
surprise and, indeed, a lawsuit was filed by the City of Albuquerque
naming the Environmental Protection Agency as a defendant.' The
Pueblo was not a party, but participated as an amicus. The stringency of
the threatened permit limitations led to the City's lawsuit. The City's
complaint reveals its belief that the Pueblo's water quality standards were
13. Id. at 10, 11.
14. Id. at 12. A key difficulty in the City's litigation strategy was that none of the costs
of compliance with the standard could be known until EPA issued a NPDES permit. Were
the City to limit its challenge to the permit, however, it would have lost its ability to
challenge the underlying standards.
15. Pueblo of Islets, Water Quality Standards, § III(N)(2) (1992).
16. The City contended that the concentration of arsenic in the Rio Grande above the
City's discharge point was 24 micrograms per liter. There is not a great deal of definitive
information establishing background levels in the river, however. The average concentration
inthe well fields from which the City draws its water was said to be 17 micrograms per
liter. City of Albuquerque's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
19, City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993).
17. Id. The district court was sufficiently impressed by the City's recitation of facts on this
issue to comment upon it, although recognizing that the issue was relevant to the issuance
of the NPDES permit, not the question before the court:
For example, the Pueblo's arsenic standard for the Rio Grande is three
orders of magnitude (1000 times) more stringent than [sic)
the federal Safe
Drinking Water Standard, and is below the concentration that can be
accurately measured by current laboratory equipment. EPA will impose
this stringent limit on the City despite the fact that arsenic occurs naturally
in Albuquerque's ground water at relatively high levels and is not
discharged to the water by industrial polluters. If pure water is discharged
at the City's outfall, it is possible that the arsenic levels in water flowing
through the Pueblo will remain relatively high.
City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 742.
18. Id.
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unattainable and unreasonable, and that EPA's approval of them was
therefore arbitrary and capricious. Following a district court decision that
was fully favorable to the United States (and, by implication, the
Pueblo), 9 the City appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.'
Although the appeal is proceeding, the City, EPA and Isleta
Pueblo have reached an agreement with EPA over the terms of the
NPDES permit. Under this agreement the City was able to procure less
stringent permit terms than it had feared would be imposed because of
the Pueblo's water quality standards, demonstrating the discretion that
EPA permit writers have in drafting permits. EPA also had reason to
settle the permit conditions; EPA's regulations suspend contested permit
terms, 2' so that delay worked in the City's advantage and to the
disadvantage of the river and the Pueblo.'
Because the lawsuit was decided on cross motions for summary
judgment, the factual allegations in the case were not fully developed.
The underlying issues are far from resolved, however. Other tribal
entities have petitioned EPA to be treated as states and are in the process
of either adopting water quality standards or seeking EPA approval for
those standards. The legal issues raised by the case remain fully relevant;
however, its facts will be developed by this article only for illustrative
purposes.
Nonetheless, in any dispute over water quality standards, the
underlying factual questions are likely to be persuasive in how one views
the merits of the dispute. For example, are tribal standards unreasonably
strict, or are the state's unreasonably lax? How expensive will it be for
upstream dischargers to comply with the standards? Should a tribe be
allowed to continue its historic use of a river for ceremonial purposes,
involving drinking from the river, when alternative water supplies are
available, and if the answer is affirmative, should upstream taxpayers
bear the cost of making a river safe for those practices? Should upstream
polluters be allowed to endanger those who depend on a river, and, is it
relevant that those uses predate the upstream discharge? One's views of
the legal merits may vary with the answers to these questions. It is
19. Id. at 742.
20. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993), appeal docketed, (10th

Cir., filed Nov. 30, 1993).
21. 40 C.F.R. § 124.60(c)(1) (1993).
22. The fact that the permit terms have been agreed to by the City will presumably play
some role in the court's decision. The injury of which the City complains occurred when the
downstream standards were applied to it, yet it was apparently able to agree to reasonable
permit terms. The City does argue that the current permit expires on June 1, 1998, when it
might again be threatened with unacceptable permit terms. Appellant's Opening Brief at 8,
n.2, City of Albuquerque v. Browner (No. 93-2315).
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noteworthy that a state's standards provide the lens through which these
questions are viewed; if tribes were to adopt standards identical to those
of the surrounding states, dischargers would have no grounds to object.
The Pueblo of Isleta's standards were at issue in the Browner case, not the
standards set by the State of New Mexico.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. State water quality standards
In unraveling the legal issues raised by conflicts between
off-reservation dischargers and tribes, two issues are fundamental. While
a state's or tribe's ability to formulate water standards which apply to
activities on its own lands is clearly established by statute, the extraterritorial application of those standards is subject to debate. The second issue
raised is the autonomy afforded a jurisdiction by EPA in designating
water quality standards.
The limitations applicable to an individual discharger are
expressed in a NPDES permit, which unites technology-based effluent
limitations with the requirements imposed by a jurisdiction's stream
standards in a single enforceable set of limitations for a discharger.' A
discharger may also be subject to other limitations, such as those imposed
by a municipal ordinance, or those found in another type of operating
permit. I
For many categories of dischargers, EPA has established effluent
limitations that specify levels of treatment that dischargers must
achieve.' The great virtue of this approach was said to be that it
removed decisions about water pollution from the uncertainties of a
system driven by ambient water quality and substituted the relative
certainty of a standard driven by engineering concerns. 6
In turning to effluent limitations in 1972, Congress was building
upon earlier attempts at improving water quality.' In 1965, Congress
had directed states to establish water quality standards for their interstate
waters.' The 1972 Act allowed states to keep in place certain existing

23.
24.
25.
26.
3675.
27.
28.

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (1994).
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988).
S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155-56 (1948).
Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
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water quality standards' (although periodic review of these standards
by the states was required)," in what seemed to be merely a vestigial
section of the Act.3' As the Act evolved, these standards have proven to
be far more critical to the Act's operation than had been assumed in 1972,
for reasons which will be elaborated upon below.
"Water quality standards," as the term is used in the Clean Water
Act, "consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and
the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses."R
While a state has some discretion in identifying the uses to which a body
of water may be put, EPA reviews the actual criteria (which are usually
expressed as numeric concentrations) required to support these uses. If
a state chooses to deviate from EPA's published criteria, EPA can require
it to justify alternative levels.'
The State of New Mexico has established water quality standards
for the Rio Grande, including that segment of the river into which the
Albuquerque POTW discharges. These standards designate uses of
limited warm water fishery, irrigation, livestock and wildlife watering,
and secondary contact recreation for that segment.' Specific numeric
standards include dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform bacteria, total
dissolved solids, sulfate, and chloride. In addition, the State's general
standards provide limitations on other pollutants.'
One omission in New Mexico's approach to its waters may have
great future significance for Isleta and the water quality of the State.
Despite the aridity of the region, and the importance of water to
biodiversity, New Mexico is one of only three western states that lacks

29. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1988).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1988). The history of this provision of the Act is explained in
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards under the Clean Water Act,
36 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1182-85 (1983).
31. The conferees explained that the new basis of pollution prevention and elimination
will be the application of effluent limitations. Water quality will be a measure of program
effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination and enforcement. The Committee
recommends the change to effluent limits as the best available mechanism to control water
pollution. With effluent limits, the Administrator can require the best control technology;
he need not search for a precise link between pollution and water quality. S. Rep. No. 414,
supra note 27,at 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1987).
33. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 16
F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993); Mississippi Commission on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d
1269 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission, Standard 2-105, Water Quality
Standards for Interstate and Intrastate Streams in New Mexico (1991), reprinted in [4 State
Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 856:1001, 1005.
35. Id. at Standard 1-102, reprinted in [4 State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 856:1002.
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statutory or administrative mechanisms to protect instream flows.'
Generally, it has not protected ecological features of its waters. For
example, no riparian standards are established for stream banks. Tribes
could presumably use their standard setting powers to protect other
values associated with water.3
B. Tribal Water Quality Standards
Jurisdiction over activities occurring on tribal lands present
difficult legal questions, but ones which Congress can readily resolve
through legislation. Earlier environmental schemes were frequently silent
about jurisdictional issues arising over tribal lands or resources;' but
Congress has amended statutes to specifically address such issues in
recent years." When Congress has done so, it has typically given tribes
jurisdiction over activities occurring on tribal lands, with authorities
comparable to those a state would exercise in administering the program.
This pattern is found in major environmental statutory schemes, such as
the Safe Drinking Water Act,' the Clean Air Act,4 the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act," and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 03
The Clean Water Act was amended in 1987 to provide that Indian
tribes could be eligible for "treatment as a State,'" when certain conditions are met. This treatment gives an eligible tribe the opportunity to
regulate the quality of waters held by the tribe, waters held in trust for
the tribe by the United States, waters held by a tribal member (under

36. Steven J.Shupe and Lawrence J.MacDonnell, Recognizing the Value of In-Place Uses
of Water in the West: An Introduction to the Laws, Strategies, and Issues, in Instream Flow
Protection in the West 1-4 (Teresa Rice and Lawrence MacDonnell eds., revised ed. 1993).
37. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v: Washington Dept. of Ecology, U.S. , 114 S. Ct.

1900 (1994).
38. This neglect of Indian country was mirrored in the administration of environmental
programs. While scholarly articles might give the picture of jurisdictional battles over who
administered environmental programs on tribal lands, the more common reality was that
remote tribal lands and their environmental problems were ignored by both states and the
EPA.
39. This is not to suggest that all disputes are resolved; indeed, this is an area where
controversy is likely to escalate, as the population of western states swells and increased
development occurs on tribal lands. Further, the difficult issues posed by activities on lands
within tribal borders that are owned by non-tribal members have yet to be resolved by
Congress. Ruth L. Kovnat, Solid Waste Regulation in Indian Country,21 N.M.L.Rev. 12 (1990).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-ll(b)(1) (1986).
41. Clean Air Act § 301(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1993).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1987).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1986).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
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limited circumstances), or water resources "otherwise within the borders
of an Indian reservation."4 s
The Administrator of EPA was directed to promulgate regulations
specifying how tribes would be treated and specifically addressing issues
arising from tribes and states setting standards on common bodies of
water.' The regulations promulgated by EPA in addressing the issues
raised by "tribes as states" 7 are a rarity in governmental rule making:
they clearly and forthrightly address the fundamental policy choices
presented by the Act. In general, the regulations contain a strong
commitment to tribal sovereignty and explicitly acknowledge the
objections which are raised to EPA's interpretation of the statute. In
particular, the Agency determined that tribal water quality standards
would be afforded the same treatment under section 510 of the Act as
state water quality standards so that tribes, like states, can adopt more
stringent water quality standards than the Act requires.* In its commentary on the regulations,4' EPA also confirmed that it anticipated
disputes between upstream dischargers and downstream jurisdictions,
and that it would object to permits which failed to meet downstream
standards, and, if required, would grant the contested permit itself. °
The dispute resolution mechanism provided by the regulations can only
be initiated by states and tribes, not others who might be affected.5'
C. The role of the EPA in determining permit terms
Under the Clean Water Act, states can administer the NPDES
permit program.' New Mexico has not sought to assume this jurisdiction and the EPA administers the program within the state. New Mexico,
through its Environment Department, must certify that proposed permits
will not cause state water quality requirements to be exceeded, under the
provisions of section 401.' Additionally, EPA must ensure compliance
with water quality standards of other states, as discussed below.'

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 56 Fed. Reg. 64876, 64879 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131), Amendments to
the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(j) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a) (1994).
49. 56 Fed. Reg. 64876-64893 (1991).
50. 56 Fed. Reg. 64887 (1991).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (1994).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
53. Id. at § 1341(a)(1).
54. Id. at § 1341(a)(2).
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IlL ARE OFF-RESERVATION DISCHARGERS SUBJECT TO A
TRIBE'S WATER QUALITY STANDARDS?
A. The NPDES permit and EPA policy
Disputes among jurisdictions over water quality are not new to
the Congress or the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Clean Water Act, as we
now know it, was built on a statutory scheme which had conflicts among
states as its primary focus.' The Supreme Court has been called upon
to resolve pollution questions among states in a series of cases dealing
with nuisance law and the effect of the Act on federal common law
actions.In InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette, 7 the Court was presented
with a conflict between the standards of the permit-issuing state and the
standards of the affected state. A nuisance claim was brought by
individuals in the affected state, under the law of that state. The Court
held that it was required to apply the law of the state where the
discharger was located, because the application of the affected state's
nuisance law was preempted. In reaching this conclusion the Court
outlined the workings of the NPDES program as it affected the controversy:
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their
own pollution, the CWA contemplates a much lesser role for
States that share an interstate waterway with the source (the
affected States). Even though it may be harmed by the
discharges, an affected State only has an advisory role in
regulating pollution that originates beyond its borders. Before
a federal permit may be issued, each affected State is given
notice and the opportunity to object to the proposed standards
at a public hearing. 33, U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2); Milwaukee III,
supra, at 412. An affected State has similar rights to be consulted before the source State issues its own permit; the source
State must send notification, and must consider the objections
and recommendations submitted by other States before taking
action.[footnote omitted]. § 1342(b). Significantly, however, an
affected State does not have the authority to block the issuance
of the permit if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards.
An affected State's only recourse is to apply to the EPA
55. A. Dan Tarlock, Upstream, Downstream: Rationalizing Different State Water Quality
Standards on Interstate Streams, 37 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 23-17 to 23-18 (1991).
56. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1986); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
57, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1986).
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Administrator, who then has the discretion to disapprove the
permit if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue
impact on interstate waters. § 1342(d)(2).m
When the Supreme Court next had occasion to consider the role of
a downstream state in NPDES permitting, it reached a strikingly different
result than might have been expected following its decision in Ouellette.
In Arkansas v. Oklahoma,5 9 the Court addressed whether the standards of
a downstream state are applied to an upstream discharger, albeit in a
case where the result is seemingly contradictory to the legal rule it
established. As the unwilling prospective recipient of Arkansas' sewage
effluent, Oklahoma objected to a NPDES permit issued by EPA to a
sewage treatment facility in Fayetteville, Arkansas. The POTW was to
discharge its effluent 22 miles upstream of the Oklahoma border. The
EPA agreed that the permit was required to comply with Oklahoma's
standards, but maintained that the permit it had issued did so, contrary
to Oklahoma's protestations. A unanimous Court upheld the permit.
In so doing, the Court explicitly declined to decide whether EPA
was required to apply the stream standards of the downstream state. In
a long-standing regulatory interpretation, EPA had taken the position that
the downstream standards were applicable. These regulations were
upheld by the Court as "a perfectly reasonable exercise of the Agency's
statutory discretion." 0 EPA's interpretation was thus found to be a
permissible, if not a necessary, reading of the statute.'
Significantly, although the Court upheld the regulations, its doing
so was not ultimately helpful to Oklahoma. Oklahoma had argued that
its stream standards, which provided for "no degradation" in the
applicable reach, were violated by the permit issued to the POTW. EPA
administratively determined that a permit could be issued if there would
be no "'actually detectable or measurable violation'" 62 of the Oklahoma
standards due to the discharge. Whether this was a correct interpretation
of the Oklahoma standards might have been assumed to be a question for
that state to determine, but the Court reasoned that EPA, in applying the
standards of another state under section 401 of the Act, was applying

58. 479 U.S. at 490-91.
59. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
60. 503 US. at 105.
61. Critical to the Court's decision, as in numerous decisions concerning review of
administrative agencies actions, was the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court
established a rule of deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of ambiguous
statutes.
62. 503 U.S. at 111. The opinion quotes the standard relied upon by EPA's Chief Judicial
Officer.
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federal law. This led the Court to again defer to EPA's interpretation,
finding that its application of the Oklahoma standards, as reflected in the
permit conditions, was "reasonable and consistent with the purposes and
principles of the Clean Water Act."'
The Court thus upheld EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act
as requiring application of the downstream state's standards, but rejected
an interpretation of these standards under which the permit would not
have been issued. Oklahoma's victory was a hollow one, because the
discharge was allowed to proceed. There is no shortage of circumstances,
however, in which the application of downstream standards would
necessitate prohibiting or strictly regulating discharges. In those instances,
EPA's interpretation could result in an effective veto of the upstream
discharge, or the imposition of stringent and expensive permit conditions.
While Arkansas is instructive for conflicts between tribal and state
standards, the case raises the question of whether the same outcome
would result if a state were to issue the NPDES permit. This is a
pertinent inquiry, because most states do administer the NPDES permit
system." The inquiry leads to murky waters.
The Act anticipates that the NPDES permit system can be administered by EPA or a state. When EPA administers it, the regulations clearly
indicate that the NPDES permit should not be issued "'[wihen the
imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable
water quality requirements of all affected states.'"" With respect to
permits issued by EPA, support for these regulations is found in section
401 of the Act which, in the language of the Arkansas court, "appearsto
prohibit the issuance of any federal license or permit over the objection
of an affected State unless compliance with the affected State's water
quality requirements can be insured."" Section 401(a)(2) provides that
EPA is to notify an affected state when a discharge may affect its waters
and that, following a hearing, the permit issued should contain conditions
based on compliance with the affected state's standards. The Act is clear
that if a discharge cannot meet those standards, no permit should issue:
"If the imposition of conditions cannot insure such compliance such
agency shall not issue such license or permit."67

63. 5.03 U.S. at 111.
64. As of December 30, 1993, 39 states had approved NPDES permit programs. 59 Fed.

Reg. 5599-5600 (14).
65. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105 (quoting from 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1991)).
66. 503 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988). While this provision seems unambiguous, the Court
indicated its reservations in stating that it "appears" to prohibit a permit where an affected
State objects. This caution may proceed from the context of section 401, which concerns
compliance by applicants for federal licenses with the Act. Subsection (2) even provides for
the Administrator of the EPA to appear at a hearing held by the licensing agency to give
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Permits issued by states are issued under the authority of section
402 of the Act.' This section is in marked contrast to section 401 with
respect to conflicts between states. Section 402 mandates that states allow
comments on permits which will affect the "downstream" state and that
the permitting state provide written reasons if it rejects the recommendations of the affected state.' The administrator of the EPA is the ultimate
authority with respect to the issuance of permits: the administrator can
object to the issuance of a permit and ultimately issue the permit with
EPA's own conditions."° The statute does not explicitly address whether
the administrator should always veto a permit that does not reflect the
standards of the downstream state, nor do the regulations issued by EPA.
However, the regulations do provide, if indirectly, that a state that issues
NPDES permits must provide for compliance with downstream standards."
Through these regulations, then, EPA has proposed a resolution of
a vexing question arising under the Clean Water Act: Which state's water
quality standards are applied in disputes among states? This interpretation is consistent with the decision in Arkansas, despite the seeming
conflict with Ouellette. One can find evidence in Arkansas that the Court
was cognizant that the effect of its decision was to uphold EPA's
interpretation with regard to state-issued permits, even though the Court
seems to signal that Ouellette is distinguishable because Arkansas involved
an EPA- issued permit: "Unlike the foregoing cases [a lengthy quote from
Ouellette proceeds this quotation], this litigation involves not a Stateissued permit, but a federally issued permit."' But, the Court proceeds
to uphold EPA regulations which it acknowledges apply to state-issued
permits as well," and which it acknowledges are issued under statutory
authority that applies to the Administrator's own permits as well as to
the Administrator in her role as overseer of state permit programs! 4
What then happens to the seemingly clear language of Ouellette? It is
relegated by the Court to a commentary on section 402(b); the rights a

the Agency's comments. If the Administrator were responsible for issuing the license (the
NPDES permit) this language would be meaningless. On the other hand, there is no
particular reason that a discharger should have to meet a downstream standard for
purposes of a nonwater quality license, but should not have to do so in the NPDES
permitting process itself, so the Court's approval of EPA's construction endorses a workable
interpretation of an inconsistent provision.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
69. Id. 1342(b)(5).
70. Id. § 1342(d)(2)-(4).
71. 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.25; 122.4(d); 122.44(d)(4) (1993).
72. 503 U.S. at 101.
73. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 1056 n.10.
74. 503 U.S. at 112-14.
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downstream state might have under that section are not the sole source
of EPA's powers to reform a permit. 5
EPA's willingness to render a formula to resolve conflicts between
the rules of competing states provides needed clarity from the executive
branch of government. While EPA's formula is not necessarily the result
that Congress intended when it passed the Clean Water Act76 these
disputes occur with sufficient frequency to require the certainty of a
predictable rule.r
EPA has adopted an interpretation of the CWA that brings about
the best water quality possible, because compliance with the standards
of two states means the most stringent standard must be achieved.'
This is surely not an unexpected nor unreasonable objective for the
nation's environmental agency. EPA's rule also has the virtue of
providing legal certainty in these disputes.7 It predictably favors
downstream entities over upstream dischargers, in a situation where the
competing claims of the jurisdictions are difficult to resolve equitably.

75. 503 U.S. at 100-101. It is perhaps unnecessary to observe that, even if the Court's
attempted reconciliation of Ouelletteand Arkansas may not be entirely satisfactory, the Court
would presumably find in Chevron ample discretion for EPA to adopt the interpretation it
has chosen.
76. The argument that this interpretation is mandated by the Clean Water Act is made
in an interesting article on interstate water pollution. Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the
River Flow: The Prospectsfor Improved Water Pollution Control, 43 J. Urban & Contemporary
Law 119 (1993).

77. Another alternative would be to maintain the historic role of the courts in resolving
interstate disputes. Professor Stewart, writing before the decision in Arkansas was reached,
argued that the Supreme Court should retain its involvement in pollution disputes among
states. He contends that the Clean Water Act should not preempt common law actions,
because the Act only contains minimum standards. Congress will not necessarily protect the
state which receives another's pollution, because a state can block remedies in Congress. He
regards compacts and bargaining among states as unlikely to protect the states which are
experiencing spillovers from another state's behavior. Richard B.Stewart, InterstateResource
Conflicts: The Role of the Federal Courts, 6 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 241 (1982).
78. Citing Arkansas for this point has elements of irony, because, despite EPA's
endorsement of this principle, its application did not bring further protection to the Illinois
river. But, while no detectable violation of the stream standard was occasioned in that
instance, that will not always be the case. Isleta Pueblo's borders are only five miles
downstream of Albuquerque's POTW outfall and the flow from the plant often dominates
the river. The contribution of the facility is quite evident a short distance downstream.
79. There is a great area of uncertainty remaining, which no rule of law can remedy. In
any conflict among states over the effect of a discharger on achieving an ambient standard,
factual disputes over the effect of the upstream discharge are inherent. Modeling must be
used to determine the contribution made by a particular discharger and its effect on water
quality. For both air and water quality, the controversy over the effect of a discharge on
ambient conditions some miles away may overshadow legal disputes.
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B. EPA review of state and tribal water quality standards
The jurisdictional conflict between Albuquerque and the Pueblo
is a consequence of the differing use designations selected by the State
and the Pueblo. To understand it, the nature of the discretion in setting
standards enjoyed by states must be probed. The related inquiry is
whether tribes share the discretion that states have in adopting standards.
EPA reviews a state's water quality standards under section 303
of the Act.80 The statutory guidance given to EPA in doing so is
surprisingly sparse. This may be due to the decision made in the 1972
Amendments to allow states to maintain the water quality standards
which had been adopted prior to the 1972 Act.8 The policy effect of this
decision was to limit EPA review to newly revised or adopted standards.' With respect to revised standards, the statute provides that the
Administrator is to determine if they meet "the requirement of this
chapter, " a and in cryptic direction, states that "such standards shall be
such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of
water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards shall be
established taking into consideration their use and value for public water
supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and
agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into
consideration their use and value for navigation. " While EPA has
somewhat expanded on this language by regulation, it has not done so
by much.
By regulation, EPA's substantive review of water quality
standards consists of little more than assuring that the State has met
"water uses which are consistent with the requirements of the Clean
Water Act".' EPA also reviews the criteria adopted to determine, inter
alia, if they protect designated uses, if the state's procedural requirements
were met, and for conformity with antidegradation requirements.' The
regulations provide that a state's standards must meet the national goal
of "water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the
water"Y8 or that the state supply "appropriate technical and scientific

80. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1988).
81. Id. § 1313(a).
82. Id. § 1313(c).
83. Id. § 1313(c)(3).
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(1) (1993).
See id. §§ 131.5-131.6.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988). EPA's regulations require a states use designations to
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data and analyses"" to support its decision not to do so. There is no
statutory mandate that states designate waters for the highest possible
use, and the states are instead left to make their own judgments about
desired use, within the rather vague limits implicit in EPA review.s
There is one area where EPA's review of state standards provides
an explicit standard. EPA has established a policy of antidegradation by
regulation, so that "downgrading" of stream segments is difficult to
accomplish.'
States also are required to adopt an antidegradation
policy. "Upgrading" of water quality, by contrast, is preserved as a
prerogative of the states by section 510 of the Act.92 This provision
effectively dispels a preemption argument that might otherwise be made
by an affected industry.
Congress made explicit in section 510 of the Act that states
retained their inherent right to have water as clean as they wished to
have it. The rule in environmental legislation is that states can be more
protective than federal legislation would require, with more stringent
state action subject to preemption only in the rare instances where a
statute specifies its preemptive effect or where a constitutional principle
is contravened. Congress has rarely chosen to disturb this pattern and the
courts are reluctant to infer a congressional intention to preempt."
There is no statutory nor regulatory provision that explicitly
prevents a state from "over-regulating" its waters. Presumably section 510
would be cited as the section that preserves a state's right to do so. If a

be consistent with this section of the statute. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(a).
88. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(4) (1993).
89. There is one puzzle about the Isleta standards that is hard to decipher. Isleta
designated its waters for several uses that it alleges are actually being made, such as
primary contact recreational use (swimming). This use also occurs on other sections of the
Rio Grande, but the state has not designated these uses on these stretches, nor had it on the
stretches now covered by Isleta's standards. EPA regulations require that state standards
"reflect the uses actually being attained." 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(i) (1993). The State believes that
swimming, while relatively commonplace, is an incidental use, that is not appropriate for
the river because of pollution and safety concerns. Interview with Jim Piatt, Surface Water
Bureau Chief, New Mexico Environment Department, in Albuquerque (July 13, 1994).
Generally, there is a great deal more primary contact recreation occurring in the State's
rivers than is reflected in use designations. Had EPA enforced its regulation, New Mexico
water quality standards might have been closer to those adopted by the Pueblo.
90. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (1993).
91. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1993).
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988); EPA observes that: "States (as defined in § 131.3) are
responsible for reviewing, establishing, and revising water quality standards. As recognized
by section 510 of the Clean Water Act, States may develop water quality standards more
stringent than required by this regulation." 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a) (1993).
93. The argument presumably would be that the specific provisions of the Act prescribing
effluent limitations foreclose more stringent state limitations.
94. See Wis. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
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state were to end all uses of its water as a means of carrying away
pollution, it would be well within its rights under federal law to do so.
The operative restraint on a state's doing so would be political. 5
As tribes begin to set water quality standards for their waters,
fears have been voiced that these standards will either be "too stringent"
or "too lax." These judgments are based on a comparison between the
existing state water quality standards and those set by the tribal
government. The plaintiffs in Browner contended that the Pueblo's
standards were overly stringent, particularly insofar as they exceeded
what were allegedly background levels in the river. They argued in their
complaint that to be approved by EPA standards must 'be based on
sound scientific rationale," "not result in unreasonable consequences," "be
attainable," and not be "more stringent than the natural background of
the water subject to those standards. " ' The role that the City ascribed
to EPA in its review of standards, whether set by tribes or states, is one
that EPA essentially disavows, as discussed above. One aspect of this
dispute concerns whether tribes have the same ability as states to provide
stringent protection to their rivers. The special instance when water
quality standards exceed background levels requires special attention.
There is no indication in the Act that Congress intended to
prohibit tribes from regulating pollution more strictly than would occur
under federal effluent limitations. Nonetheless, section 518 enumerates
the statutory provisions under which tribes exercise the powers of states
and section 510 is not listed among those provisions. This omission was
cited by the City in support of its argument that the Pueblo had
overreached in its standard setting.
Congress's failure to list section 510 as a power granted tribes has
no relevance to the power of a tribe to establish standards for two
reasons. The first stems from the sovereign powers enjoyed by tribes,
which are not created by section 518 of the Act. The second reason is that
section 510 does not apply to the adoption of standards under the Clean
Water Act and its omission is therefore irrelevant to any discussion of
tribal powers to set standards.
Generally, tribal governments have an inherent power to control
their environments, at the least through their power to exclude undesir-

95. The political process within a state can be assumed to provide some representation
in the standard setting process to powerful entities such as municipal governments and
industrial dischargers, so that a jurisdiction's desire for clean water is "balanced" against the
economic costs of reaching that goal. When the dischargers lack political representation
within a jurisdiction, the goal of clean water need not be impeded by the political power
of competing interests.
96. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 5, City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F.
Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993) (No. CIV-93-82-M).
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able activities. Absent a federal statute to the contrary, of which there is
none, a tribe can decide how its lands should be managed.' In classifying its waters, a tribe is, in effect, zoning waters, and for a purpose that
protects public health."
The second reason that the omission of section 510 from section
518's list does not affect a tribe's ability to enact stricter standards is that
section 510 is irrelevant to standard setting by tribes or states. Section 510
clarifies that the Act does not limit states with respect to water pollution,
except to prohibit less stringent regulation. Hence, its most obvious
meaning is to permit a state to impose an effluent limitation on an entity
which is more stringent than the categorical effluent limitation set by
EPA. In contrast, when a tribe establishes designated uses, and from
those derives water quality standards, there is no baseline against which
designated uses can be measured. The architecture of the Act leaves this
important factor entirely up to the states, and now the tribes. There is no
basis from which to argue that a provision of the Clean Water Act
prohibits a particular use, and therefore no clarification of state or tribal
powers is necessary.
As a matter of public policy, tribes, like states, presumably would
be encouraged under the Act to have the cleanest environment they can
afford. EPA has determined that its review of tribal standards will be the
same that it applies to state standards, with wide latitude offered to a
tribe in standard setting.
When a tribe (or a state) establishes water quality standards that
are more stringent than background levels, different questions are raised.
During the development of the regulations governing tribal water quality
under section 518, "EPA specifically invited comments regarding whether
the Agency should attempt to establish scientific factors by which
overly-stringent water quality criteria may be identified." The position
taken by the Agency offered no encouragement to those who were
concerned with "overly-stringent" criteria: "EPA believes that criteria

97. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
434-435 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on
Indian Reservations:Overview of Tribal, State,and FederalJurisdiction,17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 71
(1992); Judith V. Royster, EnvironmentalProtectionand Native American Rights: ControllingLand
Use Through Environmental Regulation, 90 Kansas J.L. & Pub. Poly 89, 93 (1991).
98. The tribal power to classify water for purposes of pollution control does not imply
ownership of the water resource nor the ability to prevent another from using it. For the
purpose of regulating water quality, a body of water is no different from land. The
implications of that designation, such as the power to regulate non-Indians, or the effect of
that designation off of the Reservation could be open to debate, but do not affect the
inherent power to control tribal resources.
99. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertains to Standards
on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,886 (1991).
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sufficiently stringent to meet the fishable and swimmable goals may not
be disapproved under the CWA, on the grounds that such criteria are
more stringent than natural background water quality.""®
Is EPA's position a wise one? This deference to local decisionmaking and environmental concern might seem unremarkable, but as
long as state and tribal standards are given extra-territorial effect through
the NPDES process, the content of these standards and EPA's role in
review of these standards will be an issue. Although the tribal-state
context may fuel this examination, the principles applied are the same as
in conflicts between states. Further, this situation forces an examination
of the use designation process, because the latitude offered tribes
demonstrates the inherent discretion offered jurisdictions in standard
setting.
C. What should be EPA's role in review of standards?
EPA's seemingly laissez faire review of tribal water quality
standards is no more extraordinary than its review of state water quality
standards. Both affected dischargers and environmentalists are concerned
with how states exercise their classification and standard setting powers.
The policy question raised by EPA's posture is whether EPA should be
given a more substantive role in approving stream use designations.
The most basic question raised about dischargers to the environment is whether they are in compliance with applicable regulations.
Similarly, we ask what percentage of the country is in compliance with
environmental standards, and gauge our progress towards environmental
quality by the answer. We do not add the caveat, "measured by the
state's own goals, which will vary from state to state, and which reflect
the political process within each state," yet for water quality this is the
only question we can answer.
When a tribe upgrades use designations for a stream, its actions
highlight the discretion implicit in water quality standard setting by
states."0 ' Generally, this discretion is visible only to those who participate closely in the state's administrative review process, so that how this
discretion is exercised is unlikely to be the subject of state legislative
action or to be a subject of electoral debate.
If EPA were more active in its review of water quality standards,

100. Id.
101. It is possible that a tribe would impose lower use designations than a state had
previously imposed on a stretch, changing a designation from a fishery to industrial use.
Although the regulations are not clear on this point, this should be treated as a proposed
downgrading, not as a state's initial choice of a use standard. To do otherwise would be to
give an unexpected effect to Congress's actions in adopting section 518.
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the role assigned to states under the Clean Water Act would be fundamentally recast." If the principle that tribes are to be treated as states
is maintained, then any expansion of EPA's review of tribal standard
setting should also extend to review of state water quality standards.
Affected industries and states might want tribes prevented from setting
"unreasonably" stringent standards. Environmentalists would insist that
it would be logical to give EPA the corollary power in a more explicit
form than it now has. This would mean that EPA would review state
water quality standards to determine whether they were too lax as well
as too stringent. "Too lax" might mean "unreasonably" protective of
dischargers.
What EPA might do in a more activist role would depend on
basic policy choices that would be made by Congress. "Attainability"
studies could be recast to determine whether water quality standards
could be achieved if the upstream entity used all of its potential powers
to reduce anthropogenic sources of pollution. Water bodies could be
designated for the most protective use which could be attained as a
matter of science, not economics. Creating an operative federal standard
of attainability would fundamentally alter the Clean Water Act, in a
model closer to that of the Clean Air Act. While environmentalists would
herald this reform, if this were the price of protection from tribal
standards, it would be too high for affected industries and some states.
EPA through regulation or Congress by statute also could protect
industries from overly stringent standards by prohibiting standards that
exceed natural background levels." a Jurisdictions that sought maximum protection for their waters still would receive it from all anthropogenic sources. The effect of considering natural background conditions in
water quality criteria would be to reassure dischargers that they,
collectively, would only be asked to remedy what could be remedied.
This approach would only be a modest improvement from the perspective of an upstream discharger, because a downstream entity could still
impose stringent limitations on it. Nonetheless, it would remove the fear
that a discharger would be subjected to one type of irrationally stringent
limitation.1°4

102. The Act's direction with respect to water quality standards is sufficiently broad that
EPA could act by regulation to change the deference it accords to states. This deference is
so much a part of the workings of the Act, however, that seeking statutory support for such
a change in interpretation would be more appropriate than a unilateral change of position.
103. EPA requires that "criteria must be based on sound scientific rationale and must
contain sufficient parameters or constituents to protect the designated use." 40 C.F.R. §
131.11. This does not mean that criteria more stringent than natural background levels must
be rejected, however, because criteria merely support designated uses, and a use could be
designated despite impaired water quality.
104. In fact, the consequence to a discharger of a water quality standard set above
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The autonomy offered states, and now tribes, in water quality
standard setting is one of the most ingrained features of the Clean Water
Act, although it is in marked contrast to the regulatory schemes that
control other environmental media. This single case is not a sufficient
basis for more than a suggestion that the results of this autonomy deserve
national scrutiny. As water quality standards grow in importance in the
Act's implementation, the uniformity sought in 1972 is diminished by the
varying approaches taken by states and tribes.
D. EPA's role in resolving conflicts arisingout of differences in state
and tribal standards.
Congress anticipated that conflicts were likely to ensue under
Section 518. EPA was given the daunting task of discovering a "mechanism" through which any "unreasonable consequences" arising from this
section were to be resolved. The Administrator was directed to promulgate regulations that would:
provide a mechanism for the resolution of any unreasonable
consequences that may arise as a result of differing water
quality standards that may be set by States and Indian tribes
located on common bodies of water. Such mechanism shall
provide for explicit consideration of relevant factors including,
but not limited to, the effects of differing water quality permit
requirements on upstream and downstream dischargers,
economic impacts, and present and historical uses and quality
of the waters subject to such standards. Such mechanism
should provide for the avoidance of such unreasonable
consequences in a manner consistent with the objective of this
chapter.10 5
EPA, which was no more able to resolve unresolvable issues among
competing sovereigns than was Congress, never found the mechanism
that Congress sought. Its regulations established a dispute resolution
process to address conflicts between tribes and states, assuming that
mediation or arbitration would resolve these questions." The appropriate Regional Administrator is charged with conducting the process, in

background is unlikely to be as irrational as it might appear. This is because EPA has
discretion in fashioning permit limitations, If there is no permit limit that will cause
downstream standards to be met, because they cannot be met by human sources, then EPA
need not write a permit that is unreasonable in its expectations of a discharger. On the other
hand, that this discretion is vested in a permit writer cannot provide full reassurance to a
discharger.
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988).
106. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (1994).
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instances where "the difference in water quality standards results in
unreasonable consequences. " " The term "unreasonable consequences"
is not defined. The regulations do anticipate that one of the parties to the
proceedings might be unwilling and a recommendation can be reached
in the absence of a party. No substantive guidance is given as to what
policies control the resolution of these disputes.
The most significant provision of the regulations is what is missing
from them; the Regional Administrator is given no authority to enforce
or implement "recommendations" following the proceedings. Hence, if the
parties do not agree to be bound by mediation or arbitration, EPA has
chosen not to resolve these disputes, presumably leaving the parties to
whatever relief can be found in the courts.ls EPA failed to do what it
had been charged by Congress with doing: providing a mechanism that
would resolve unreasonable consequences.
The designation by EPA of some form of negotiation as a "mechanism" seems unexceptional. The significant policy choice was the rejection
of a role for itself as arbiter and decisionmaker.m To be sure, this
rejection finds some support in the difference between this section and
that used in the parallel section of the Clean Air Act. Just as EPA can
argue that Congress did not ask it to play this role,"' the statute can
also support a reading that Congress intended to authorize a stronger
role. For EPA to have assumed this role would have required the exercise
of discretion in reviewing state and tribal standards; a role that EPA has

107. Id. § 131.7(b)(1).
108. In its commentary on this regulation, EPA took the position that it did not have the
authority to require parties to submit to binding arbitration. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,887 (1991).
109. The adoption of these regulations was controversial, in part because of the contention
of some western states that they had not been properly consulted in the preparation of the
regulations. D. Craig Bell and Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses:
The History of Conflict, The Prospects for Accommodation, 21 Envtl. L. J. 66-69 (1991). The
specific question of whether the negotiation mechanism should have binding force was
apparently not the subject of comment during the regulation development process. An early
draft of EPA's (Draft Water Quality Standards Regulation on Indian Tribes, Jan. 11, 1988)
leaves the impression that conflicts could be forwarded to the Administrator for resolution,
and that "If voluntary efforts fail, EPA would examine regulatory remedies or in some cases
seek judicial relief pursuant to the provisions of a treaty or statute administered by another
Agency." Since that time, the Agency has consistently taken the position that it cannot
resolve disputes over the objections of parties. The reason for the lack of comments on this
aspect of the regulations are speculative. One reason may be that no set of stakeholders was
willing to assume that its interests would be served with EPA as a decision-maker.
110. EPA can also make a more persuasive argument that it did not express in its
commentary on the regulations. The statutory language concerning dispute resolution in the
Clean Air Act leaves no doubt that EPA is to resolve disputes and revise state implementation plans if necessary in implementing its decisions, as discussed in the text, infra note 136,
and the difference in language can be cited to establish that Congress wanted a less
authoritative role for EPA under the Clean Water Act.
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disclaimed throughout its regulations. The context and the legislative
history of the statute.. suggest that Congress intended to pass these
judgments to EPA, and expected individualized examinations of conflicts
where there were "unreasonable consequences." EPA has instead
provided a predictable decision rule, but has disavowed any responsibility for the consequences that may flow from it.
EPA made another noteworthy policy choice in fashioning these
regulations that led to a challenge of the regulations in Browner. The City
did not have the option of utilizing the dispute resolution mechanism
because the regulations provide that only a tribe or a state can initiate the
proceeding." 2 The Pueblo, of course, had no reason to initiate the
proceeding. The State of New Mexico chose not to do so. In its complaint
the City contended that EPA had not adopted the required regulations
under section 518."' The opinion of the district court upheld the
regulations, citing EPA's reasoning that only states and tribes could
initiate the process because only they, and not private parties, have the
ability to issue water quality standards."'
One reason the dispute mechanism was never utilized may be the
procedural posture of the case. The City chose to appeal from the EPA's
approval of the Pueblo's standards, alleging that the standards were
themselves unreasonable. The City's concern was less the abstract
rationality of the standards, however, than the actual permit limits to
which it would be subject because of the standards. Those limits were
under development by EPA, which has a great deal of discretion in their
formulation. While the City's appeal was not premature, in that it was
potentially affected by the standards, its allegations of injuries rested
upon a permit it had not yet seen. The State may have preferred to let
EPA determine how the permit limits would be applied before initiating
the process. From a political perspective, the State would thereby sidestep
an unnecessary conflict with tribal officials.
An alternative explanation is that the State, as represented by the
New Mexico Environment Department, did not believe that the consequences were unreasonable. While the Pueblo's standards were more
protective than the Commission charged with standard setting had
imposed, they were not necessarily more stringent than the environmental professionals at the Environment Department wanted. The costs of
compliance to Albuquerque were speculative, both because of the
questions about actual permit levels and because effluent improvements
111. See discussion infra note 119 to 129.
112. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7(b)(6) (1993).
113. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at Count 13, City of Albuquerque v. Browner,
865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993)(No. CIV-93-82-M).
114. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 740.
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attributed by the City to Pueblo standards may have been necessary for
other reasons.
Opening up the dispute resolution mechanism would not seem to
favor either the discharger or the environment, assuming that the process
could be invoked by citizens as well as dischargers. While in the Isleta
example a discharger would be seeking relief from protective standards,
the provision also could be used to pressure a state to strengthen its
water quality standards when they were less protective than a tribe's.
EPA's decision to limit the initiation of dispute resolution to states
and tribes may prove, in retrospect, to have been shortsighted. A state
government's interests are not necessarily aligned with that of each point
source discharger on a river, and the state certainly has different interests
than does a particular discharger. While there is nothing prohibiting
dialogue outside the regulatory framework among the discharger, the
Pueblo, the State and the EPA, EPA could facilitate the use of alternatives
to litigation through a more open process.
By refusing to decide disputes, the EPA interpreted the dispute
resolution provisions of section 518 in a fashion that is consistent with its
insistence that tribes are to be treated identically to states. If EPA were
authorized to modify standards as a result of a dispute resolution
process, then this parallelism would be destroyed. EPA also was
consistent in barring dischargers from initiating dispute resolution
mechanisms where they are unhappy with the standards adopted by a
jurisdiction, a review they lack when a state adopts a standard.
There is no ready rejoinder to EPA's policy preferences and a great
deal of logic to them. Nonetheless, based on the language of section 518's
dispute resolution mechanism and the legislative history, discussed
below, there is reason to believe that Congress felt tribal standard setting
raised special issues, or at least was ready to ameliorate the expressed
concerns of western states. EPA has chosen instead an interpretation that
puts maximum value on identical treatment of tribes and states." 5
IV. STEPPING BACK: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT CONCERNING
SECTION 518 AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL DISCRETION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
To reach the conclusion that EPA is well within its regulatory
authority in its determination that tribes can stringently protect their
115. Professor Tarlock suggests that equitable apportionment principles are a useful place
for the courts or Congress to seek guidance in resolving interstate disputes. A. Dan Tarlock,
Upstream, Downstream: Rationalizing Different State Water Quality Standards on Interstate
Streams, 37 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 23-7 (1991). These principles could be equally useful in
resolving differences between tribal and state standards.
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waters and that compliance may be exacted from dischargers outside
tribal boundaries is, surprisingly, not to conclude that this is the result
that Congress intended when it enacted section 518. The legislative
history is relatively sparse, but does point to a very different reading of
the statute than EPA gives it.
Section 518 was not the subject of much discussion in the
legislative process leading to the 1987 revisions. The legislative vehicle for
the reauthorization of the Act"" was amended on the House floor by
the addition of a provision which was to become, with one addition,
" and accepted without debate. The Conference Committee
section 518, 1
that was ultimately convened on the bill accepted the House language on
this point, but added what is now codified as subsection (a), explicitly
directing that the Act was not intended to affect state or tribal powers to
allocate water under section 101(g).
The primary focus of comments about section 518 concerned the
importance of providing funding to tribal governments for sewage
works,"' but the potential conflicts resulting from the ability of tribes
to set water quality standards were also the subject of comment. Two
relevant beliefs about the effect of section 518 surfaced in the discussion,
and they are not consistent. The first was that the dispute resolution
provision of section 518 would resolve potential conflicts. It was cited as
the factor that alleviated concerns that a tribe "might set an unreasonable
standard in order to get leverage over a city on an unrelated matter, or
to force a city to make water quality expenditures that would otherwise
be considered unnecessary.""' 9 The very existence of the dispute
resolution provision presupposes disputes over standards: "[TIhe
conferees have assured me that the Administrator of EPA would settle
any dispute between State and Indian tribe water quality standards, that
the Administrator would take the economic consequences into account,
and that he would not allow disputes over water quantity to cloud the
water quality issue. Neither would the Administrator be expected to
simply accept the more stringent of the Indian or State standard."'
Senator Simpson, who supported the reauthorization as a member of the
Conference Committee, explained that the questions created by permit116. H.R. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in Envtl. and Nat. Resources Pol'y Div.,
Cong. Research Serv., A Legislative History of the Water Quality Act of 1987, at 1177 (1988)
[hereinafter Legislative Historyl.
117. 131 Cong. Rec. H6037 (daily ed. July 23, 1985) (statement of Rep. Roe), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 117, at 1012.
118. 132 Cong. Rec. S16607-01 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statements of Senators Hart and
Abdnor), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 117, at 650-51.
119. 132 Cong. Rec. S16607-08 (daily ed. Oct. 16,1986) (statement of Sen. Hecht), reprinted
in Legislative History, supra note 117, at 652.
120. Id.
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ting tribes to set water quality standards were "similar to those in the
interstate arena," and that the committee's "agreement includes direction
to the Environmental Protection Agency to develop a mechanism for
dispute resolution in this context, as well as a requirement that certain
factors be explicitly included in the disposition of all situations requiring
resolution of any unreasonable consequences that may arise a result of
differing water quality standards that may be set by states and Indian
tribes on common bodies of water." 2 '
Other members believed that section 518 would have no effect
outside of reservation boundaries. In the discussion in the House on
section 518,', a memorandum to Morris Udall, then chair of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, was cited by Mr. Morrison of
Washington State, as addressing "the implications of the provisions of this
Clean Water Act as they relate to Indian tribes and water quality and
quantity.""z ' (This memorandum was also relied upon in the Senate
discussion of the bill.") The memorandum is primarily addressed to
the effect of the pending legislation on tribal rights to water, but does
comment on its effect on neighboring jurisdictions. The conclusion
reached by the authors concerning the effect of tribal water quality
standards on states was clear:
However, just as in inter-state conflicts, nothing in that
requirement, in the existing Clean Water Act, or in any other
provision of H.R. 1 gives the EPA administrator or the tribes
the power to force states to alter their approved water quality
standards or their operations under an approved Plan in order
to accommodate higher tribal water quality standards. Nor is
there anything in the existing law or proposed amendments
which would permit Indian Tribes to project their internal
regulations beyond the boundaries of their reservation ....
We can find nothing in the Clean Water Act, as proposed to
be amended by H.R. 1 which would in any way.., expand or
enhance the power of Indian Tribes to affect off-reservation
activity ''which might degrade or despoil on-reservation water
quality. 125
121. 133 Cong. Rec. 51025 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Simpson), reprinted
in Legislative History, supra note 117, at 499.
122. Following President Reagan's pocket veto of the 1986 legislation, the bill was brought
before the House as H.R. I on January 8, 1987. See 133 Cong. Rec. H161 (daily ed. Jan. 8,

1987) (statement of Rep. Moaldey), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 117, at 515.
123. 133 Cong. Rec. H168, H184 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1987) (statement of Rep. Morrison),
reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 117, at 550.
124. See 133 Cong. Rec. S733 (daily ed. Jan. 14,1987) (statement of Sen. Adams), reprinted
in Legislative History, supra note 117, at 393.
125. 133 Cong. Rec. H185 (daily ed. Jan. 8,1987), reprinted in LegislativeHistory, supra note
117, at 551-52.
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The Senate discussion proceeded along much the same line. Senator
Burdick stated that "[those water quality standards set by Indian tribes
and accepted by EPA will not be used off reservation borders"," and
the floor manager, Senator Mitchell, indicated his assent to this interpretation. Senator Hatch, a few days later, reiterated the discussion,
of the importance of this matter to Western States in particu"because
" 28
iar.4

From the legislative history, the lack of foresight into how section
518 would ultimately be implemented is evident. Those who expected
EPA to be involved in the "disposition" of situations where there were
unreasonable consequences did not foresee that the autonomy offered by
EPA to standard setting jurisdictions was not to be so easily overturned
by Congress and that EPA would not find in section 518 a mandate to
actually resolve disputes. And those who did not believe that stream
standards could have an effect outside tribal lands were not listening to
their colleagues, who anticipated conflicts and provided a provision to
address them. Nor, to be fair, were these members informed by the
memorandum on which they evidently relied that NPDES permit writing,
as practiced by EPA, had exactly that effect once standards were
approved.
Legislative history is not law. However, the stance adopted by EPA
is contrary to the expectations of at least some of the members of
Congress who participated in the adoption of this law. This reality may
demand more credence in the political world than it does in the office of
the staff person who is drafting regulations or in the courts.
A. Tribal standardsetting under the Clean Air Act
The role of tribes under the Clean Air Act provides an obvious
footnote to this discussion. Air, like water, moves freely across jurisdictional boundaries and tribes have as persuasive reasons to be concerned
with their air quality as they do with water quality. Nonetheless,
reference to the Clean Air Act for wisdom in approaching jurisdictional
conflicts is in vain, although it provides one bit of insight into the dispute
resolution provisions of section 518.
Interstate air pollution has received more attention from Congress
in recent years than has interstate water pollution. The interstate

126. 133 Cong. Rec. S753 (daily ed. Jan. 14,1987) (Statement of Sen. Burdick), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 117, at 393.
127. Id.
128. 133 Cong. Rec. S1023 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1987) (Statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 117, at 496.
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transport of acid deposition was a major component of the most recent
reauthorization of the Clean Air Act, leading to a comprehensive
reworking of the statute. Other disputes among states, in which a state
alleges that a source in another state is causing pollution, have proven
virtually intractable. The pre-1990 statute provided only indirect remedies
for affected states; EPA was charged with investigation and determination
of whether sources had caused the complaining state's implementation
plan to be violated" and the statute contained a requirement that a
state's implementation plan not permit pollution in another state in excess
of the primary air quality standards."3 These provisions were charitably
described as "generally ineffective." 11,
The 1990 amendments revisited the subject of conflicts between
states, but commentators express little optimism over the results:
Although the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 constitute
legislation on a grand scale, the interstate air pollution
amendments are disappointingly shallow. There remain
formidable obstacles to effective regulation and enforcement,
particularly for downwind states. The inveterate problems
include: identifying specific sources, defining 'significant
contribution', compelling the EPA to act, and persuading
courts that the EPA has
32 acted so unreasonably as to be
arbitrary and capricious.'
Tribes were granted the power to classify their air in 1977 " and
the power to enforce air quality regulations in 1990." Tribes and
pueblos are found in both sparsely populated rural areas and directly
abutting major cities. While spillover effects in urban areas are easy to
imagine, even rural settings may have significant air quality problems
from large scale industrial facilities, such as coal fired generating
facilities, located near or on tribal lands. With disparate jurisdictions
having the power to classify their air quality, the potential for conflict
between adjoining jurisdictions is evident.
Disputes between tribes and states over redesignation of air and
over permits for major new facilities were anticipated by subsection (e),
which, like the Clean Water Act, provides a dispute resolution procedure.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (1988).

130. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(E)(i).
131. Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the River Flow: The Prospects for Improved Water
PollutionControl, 43 Wash. U. J.Urb. & Contemp. L. 119,167 (1993); Kay M. Crider, Interstate
Air Pollution:Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 Chi. Kent L. Rev, 619 (1988).
132. Timothy Talkington, Interstate Air Pollution Abatement and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990: Balancing Interests, 62 U. Colo. L Rev. 957, 979 (1991).
133. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (Supp. H 1990).
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Affected tribes or states can request the Administrator of EPA to convene
negotiations and to issue a recommendation concerning the dispute.'3
In contrast to the Clean Water Act's provision, the statute clearly requires
the Administrator to resolve disputes, with resolutions imposed through
the applicable plan. The judgments that EPA is reluctant to make about
water quality standards are inescapable for air quality disputes."
V. CONCLUSION
Case studies are more satisfying when conflicting claims are
neatly posed, supported by accomodating facts. This discussion should
not be concluded without noting that the facts here are not quite as
accomodating as one might hope. Permit limits on Albuquerque's POTW,
no matter how stringent, will not result in achievement of Isleta's water
quality standards. In this sense, any declaration of the legal rights of the
downstream entity is hollow, because Isleta Pueblo lacks the ability to
force compliance with its standards by nonpoint source dischargers and
dischargers of agricultural return flows.
The Clean Water Act is directed at point source dischargers,
which are the entities required to possess NPDES permits."3 ' A tribe
which imposes protective water quality standards for its waters is limited
to influencing upstream dischargers through the NPDES permitting

135. The section reads in full as follows:
If any State affected by the redesignation of an area by an Indian tribe or
any Indian tribe affected by the redesignation of an area by a State
disagrees with such redesignation of any area, or if a permit is proposed
to be issued for any new major emitting facility proposed for construction
in any State which the Governor of an affected State or governing body of
an affected Indian tribe determines will cause or contribute to a cumulative
change in air quality in excess of that allowed in this part within the
affected State or tribal reservation, the Governor or Indian ruling body may
request the Administrator to enter into negotiations with the parties
involved to resolve such dispute. If requested by any State or Indian tribe
involved, the Administrator shall make a recommendation to resolve the
dispute and protect the air quality related values of the lands involved. If
the parties involved do not reach agreement, the Administrator shall
resolve the dispute and his determination, or the results of agreements
reached through other means, shall become part of the applicable plan and
shall be enforceable as part of such plan. In resolving such disputes
relating to area redesignation, the Administrator shall consider the extent
to which the lands involved are of sufficient size to allow effective air
quality management or have air quality related values of such an area.
42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (1988).
136. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(t) (1994).
137. 33 US.C. §§ 1342-1362(12) (1988).
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Nonpoint source polluters have enjoyed favorable treatment in
the Clean Water Act, despite widespread recognition of their contribution
to water pollution. In New Mexico the state has estimated that 87 percent
of its impaired water quality segments is due to nonpoint source
pollution.'" What is remarkable in New Mexico is how few direct
dischargers there are; outside of dischargers subject to the new stormwater regulations, there are only 137 permitted direct dischargers in the
state."4 The Isleta Pueblo suffers from another omission in the Clean
Water Act, as well. The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
provides irrigation water to Albuquerque and surrounding areas,
including Isleta Pueblo. The discharges by the Conservancy to the river
are treated as exempt from the Clean Water Act's NPDES permitting
scheme, presumably because they are believed to be irrigation return
flows.'
New Mexico's legislature has also indicated its desire to
protect agricultural operations from environmental regulation.
Although the Pueblo may have a common law claim against these
discharges, the Clean Water Act does not appear to afford Isleta any
remedies.
Downstream entities, while legally potent against certain
dischargers, will ultimately fail in their quest for clean water until
nonpoint source dischargers are brought under effective regulatory
control. As the Act is now written, how nonpoint source dischargers are
ultimately regulated by Congress and the states will affect whether tribal
goals are realized.
While control of point sources will not by itself solve water
pollution, it makes a great deal of difference to these point sources
whether higher standards are imposed on them by tribal water standards.
The conflicting claims represented in the recognition of the powers of
tribes over their environments are intriguing and difficult to resolve. In

138. There is one other section of the regulations which is related to a tribe's ability to
attain the water quality standards it establishes. EPA's regulations require that a state's
water quality standards ensure "attainment and maintenance" of downstream standards. 40
C.F.R. § 131.10(b) (1994). EPA suggests that both tribes and states will be held to this
provision in seeking approval of water standards. However, by not imposing controls on

nonpoint source dischargers, the state has not attained its own standards, much less more
stringent ones. The problem is less with the standards that appear on paper than in the
failure to adopt regulations to achieve them.
139. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission, Water Quality and Water Pollution
Control in New Mexico (1992).
140. Id.
141. Irrigation return flows are exempted from the Act's definition of point source. 33

U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988).
142. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-6-4(K)(Michie 1993).

Fall 19951

STATE AND TRIBAL WATER STANDARDS

the arid west, the importance of water to people and ecosystems cannot
be overstated. A tribe's ability to control its environment is empty indeed
if water cannot be put to uses which are important to the people of the
region.
The claims of a municipal or industrial discharger are also
difficult to discount. Extraterritorial disputes over environmental practices
raise classic issues in environmental policy. The jurisdiction where the
polluting entity resides enjoys the benefits associated with the activity
(jobs, provision of water to city inhabitants), while the downstream entity
enjoys only the residuals of the activity (wastewater). Each interest lacks
political power in the other's decisionmaking over pollution standards
and water quality standards.
Congress, in the Clean Water Act, or perhaps more to the point,
EPA in its interpretation of the Clean Water Act, has formulated policies
in which the preference is for clean water, so that a discharger will have
to meet the stricter of either its jurisdiction's or the downstream
jurisdiction's standards. In a post Chevron era, EPA's interpretation,
although not forced by the statute, is likely to prevail in the courts.
The Clean Water Act was intended to make waters of the United
States cleaner; indeed, clean enough to permit swimming and fishing.
EPA's policies further that goal by enforcing stricter downstream
standards on upstream dischargers. But, insofar as politically and
economically weak tribal governments are the victors, to expect a stasis
of outcome is possibly naive. Environmental law is a dance among the
Congress, the administrative agencies, and the courts, with any disgruntled party likely to pursue relief in any of these fora. A result that is
viewed as unfair and unreasonable by significant dischargers is likely to
be revisited by Congress, as well as the courts. For that reason, further
involvement of EPA in addressing the underlying scientific and technological aspects of water quality standards may foreclose arguments for
maintaining that the statutory provision is an irrational one. The most
direct way for EPA to do so would be to modify the dispute resolution
mechanism, and to actually resolve the conflicting claims of jurisdictions.
This single case lends shaky support for reconsideration of
standard setting in the Clean Water Act, but as more tribes utilize their
power to protect their waters, the adequacy of protection given by some
state's standards will be highlighted. Comparative studies of standard
setting could provide valuable information as to how well federalism has
worked for clean water, and to consider whether, in light of the growing
importance of stream standards, a more activist role for EPA is desirable.
In the rare instance where a state or tribe adopts standards that
exceed natural background levels and a discharger outside the jurisdiction is affected, EPA can rather readily diffuse the conflict, without
compromising the principles of tribal or state sovereignty. It can indicate
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how permits will be formulated where standards are more stringent than
background levels, so that dischargers realize that they will have to do
their share, not the impossible.
A description of a conflict between a city and a small pueblo
omits much. Tribes and western cities are neighbors, and the complex
array of relationships that characterizes neighbors can be found in this
setting. The New Mexico legislature has provided grant funds to tribal
governments to assist them in administering water programs. The shared
interest in preventing environmental abuse is shown in Memoranda of
Understanding and cross-deputization arrangements between tribes and
states. Tribal employees are scrutinizing the practices of those who live
on tribal lands for environmental compliance, examining practices that
have been ignored in the past. Some tribal programs will become models
for state programs, especially in areas that are not mandated by federal
programs, such as control of nonpoint source pollution.
Neither state nor tribal governments are likely to monopolize the
role of environmental defenders, despite the facts in a particular case.
Environmental protectiveness and sovereignty are two different principles, and on occasion opportunities for profit will make both states and
tribes poor neighbors, when poorly sited or operated facilities are allowed
into a jurisdiction. Concerns about a neighbor's autonomy should not be
dismissed as necessarily ill-intentioned.
A final postscript indicates how delicately balanced is the dance
of interests in western water pollution policy. As western cities face
higher costs from waste water disposal, off-stream means of disposal
become more attractive. These can range from irrigation of golf courses
to recharge of groundwater aquifers for eventual municipal reuse. Unless
tribes or other downstream entities have rights to that water, a victory
over water quality standards could mean the loss of water in the river,
with the loss of all the value of a living river. Just this alternative of
diverting its effluent to recharge groundwater is being explored by the
City of Albuquerque.

